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PATENTS-MISUSE DoCTR.INE-MULTIPLE LICENSES WITH PRICE-FIXING PRO-
VISOS AS SHERMAN ACT VIOLATION-In a suit for infringement of a moire 
process patent, relief was denied by the trial court1 partially on the ground 
that plaintiff had misused its patent by violating section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.2 Plaintiff had licensed two other moire finishers to use the patented 
process. Each license contained a proviso that plaintiff could specify the 
prices the licensee was to charge its customers for finishing cloth with the 
patented process. On appeal, held, affirmed. It is a violation of the anti-
trust laws for a patentee to issue more than one license containing price-
fixing provisions. Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., (3d Cir. 
1956) 237 F. (2d) 283. 
The patent misuse doctrine states that a patent owner who uses his 
patent in a manner contrary to the public interest cannot maintain an 
infringement suit.3 Using the patent so as to violate the antitrust laws 
constitutes patent misuse.4 In the principal case, the court found such an 
antitrust violation from the fact that plaintiff's licenses had price-fixing 
provisions,5 notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in the leading 
case of United States v. General Electric Co.6 to the effect that the issuing 
1 (D.C. N.J. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 372. Other issues in the principal case are discussed 
in (D.C. N.J. 1953) 116 F. Supp. 759; (3d Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 580; (D.C. N.J. 1955) 
136 F. Supp. 923. 
2 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1. 
3 See generally Rich, "Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952," 
21 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 521 (1953). 
4 Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Devel. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931). On the patents-
antitrust relationships generally, see Oppenheim, "Patents and Antitrust-Peaceful Co-
existence?" 54 MICH. L. REV. 199 (1955). 
5 Contra: Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Bulldog Electric Products Co., (4th Cir. 
1953) 206 F. (2d) 574; Fruit Machinery Co. v. F. M. Ball & Co., 118 Cal. App. (2d) 748, 
258 P. (2d) 852 (1953); General Electric Co. v. Willey's Carbide Tool Co., (E.D. Mich. 
1940) 33 F. Supp. 969. See 2 CONTRAcrs REsTATEMENT §515, illus. 12 (1932). See also 
Ronson Patents Corp. v. Sparklets Devices, (E.D. Mo-. 1953) 112 F. Supp. 676; United 
States v. Wayne Pump Co., (N.D. Ill. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 949, app. dismissed 317 U.S. 200 
(1942); Straight Side Basket Corp. v. Webster Basket Co., (2d Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 245. 
Cf. Glen Raven Knitting Mills v. Sanson Hosiery Mills, (4th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 845; 
MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., (W.D. Pa. 1942) 45 F. Supp. 236, affd. 
(3d Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 870; American Lead Pencil Co. v. Musgrave Pencil Co., 170 
Tenn. 60, 91 S.W. (2d) 973 (1936); Casco Products Corp. v. Kenny, (S.D. N.Y. 1935) 
24 U.S.P.Q. 171. Cf. also United States v. United States Pipe and Foundry Co., (D.C. 
N.J. 1948) 1948-49 CCH Trade Cases 1[62,285. 
6 272 U.S. 476 (1926). General Electric and its licensee under the price-fixing license, 
Westinghouse, accounted for 85% of the total domestic electric lamp business; 8% more 
was done by thirteen other GE licensees (whose licenses contained quantity, but not 
price, restrictions). 
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of one such license was lawful.7 It is true that in recent cases8 some mem-
bers of the Supreme Court have pointed out the apparent conflict between 
the General Electric decision and the rule enunciated a year later in United 
States v. Trenton Potteries Co.9 that price fixing between competitors is a 
per se violation of the Sherman Act. Consequently, the exact bounds of the 
General Electric rule are presently obscure. In its decision in the principal 
case the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit limited General Electric 
to its precise facts. The rationale of General Electric is that (1) a patentee 
should be allowed to insert into his licenses any condition which is 
reasonably within the scope of the reward embodied in the patent concept, 
and (2) since a patentee can set his own market price by refusing to license 
others, it is reasonable for him to exact a license condition which guarantees 
that his licensee will not undersell him.10 Price protection encourages a 
patentee to grant licenses and thus actually engenders competition11 in all 
respects except price.12 This rationale, if valid at all, is equally applicable 
to the principal case,13 since no logical antitrust distinction can be drawn 
from the mere fact14 that two or more licenses with price-fixing arrange-
ments were issued instead of only one. A license lawful when standing 
alone should not become unlawful when a similar license is granted to 
another, unless something equivalent to a conspiracy can be found.11> The 
decision in the principal case is subject to the criticism that it makes no 
attempt to distinguish between the purely vertical bargaining here involved, 
in which apparently each license was negotiated separately and without con-
cert between licensees, and situations with a hortizontal element of concert of 
action, which did appear in the cases which the court cites.16 There are, of 
7 But the patentee is not allowed to control the price at which the licensee's purchaser 
subsequently sells the product. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940). 
8 Thus in United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948), Justices Douglas, 
Black, Murphy and Rutledge voted to overrule General Electric. See generally Holla-
baugh, "Patents and Antitrust Laws," 25 UNIV. CIN. L. REv. 43 at 62 (1956). Compare 
Celler, "Patents and Monopoly," 38 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 425 at 434 (1956). 
9 273 U.S. 392 (1927). See generally Peppin, "Price-Fixing Agreements Under the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Law," 28 CALIF. L. REv. 297, 667 (1940). 
10 Indeed, the patentee could obtain one form of lawful price-protection simply by 
making the royalty so high that the licensee could not afford to drop prices below those 
of the patentee. 
11 But see Stedman, "Invention and Public Policy," 12 LAw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 649 
at 676 (1947). Cf. Hollabaugh, "Patents and Antitrust Laws," 25 UNIV. CIN. L. REv. 43 
at 66 (1956). 
12E.g., brand competition. Cunningham, "Brand Loyalty-What, Where, How Much?" 
34 HARV. Bus. REv. 116 (1956). 
13 See Rogers, "Price Control Under Patent Agreements," 12 UNIV. Pm. L. REv. 569 
at 576 (1951). 
14 The opinion in the principal case is devoid of any statement as to the relative size 
of the litigating parties to each other or to others in the industry, nor is there any dis-
cussion of how important the licensed process was to the industry as a whole or how 
it compared with the other moire processes in extent of use. 
15 REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAws 241 (1955). But see Diggins, "The Patent-Antitrust Problem," 53 MICH. L. 
REv. 1093 at 1099 (1955). 
16 In United States v. Line Material Co., note 6 supra, there was cross-licensing 
between patentees. In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948), 
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course, many ways in which a patentee might use his patent so as to justify 
a conclusion that such use was improper under the antitrust laws,17 but 
so long as the General Electric decision stands it is inconsistent with the 
p~inciple of that case to find misuse in the mere existence of more than one 
license containing a price-fixing proviso. 
Herbert A. Bernhard, S.Ed. 
all former competitors in an entire industry were licensed, each individual license was 
entered into with knowledge on the part of the licensee of the adherence of all other 
licensees, and the intention of licensor and licensees to act in concert was apparent from 
the face of the licenses. This concert of action is emphasized in United States v. United 
States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 at 83 (1950). United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 
U.S. 371 (1952), involved patent pooling. Further, the prices which the licensor might 
establish were to bind the licensee only if imposed at the same time and in the same 
terms upon the licensor and all other licensees. 
l7E.g., package licensing, condemned in the situation involved in Ethyl Gasoline 
Corp. v. United States, note 7 supra. 
